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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the practice in France since the 1990s in working towards decisions on 
major infrastructure. Whilst in some European countries the drive since that time has been to 
press faster decision making and deregulation, in France the response to difficulties in 
progressing large infrastructure schemes was to move to more deliberative approaches, both 
at the project level and in relation to environmental issues as a whole. The paper considers 
these approaches alongside the growing literature on deliberative democracy, particularly that 
on deliberative systems.  It is suggested that there is much scope to learn from the 
accumulated experience in these fields, which could help to provide a more considered, open 
and pluralist approach to infrastructure decisions, genuinely taking account of all alternatives, 
as against the tendency to move to a more demand driven and limited democracy approach 
which has been promoted in England and Wales in the UK and to a certain extent at EU level 
as well. 
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Learning from France: Using public deliberation to tackle infrastructure planning 
issues 
 
Introduction 
Planners, both practitioners and academics, often look beyond their own states for inspiration, 
emulation or transfer, despite the known risks in this exercise (Beatley 2012, Masser and 
Williams 1986, Ward 1999, 2010).  In Europe, France has rarely been the main country 
studied, although most recently its skill at inserting tram systems in its cities has been 
admired (Hall 2013). But in one area, the steering of major infrastructure, France has had a 
rich experience in the last two decades, which should be of interest in other countries. So here 
the focus is on this experience, and in particular the use of deliberative approaches. 
 
 
The aims of the paper are twofold.  The first is to expose a non-French audience to the 
practices which have been developed in France recently, in the hope that these will be of 
interest and relevance to planners and public policy makers in other countries. Secondly this 
practice will be related to the deliberative political thinking developed recently, to see 
whether the practice and thinking can shed light on each other.  The conclusion, in brief, is 
that French experience challenges to some degree the emerging thinking of deliberative 
theorists and may suggest fresh paths and issues which that theorising should explore in the 
future.  The empirical material in the core of the paper consists of two distinct zones of 
French innovation, one which addresses the field of major infrastructure projects, and the 
other which uses large scale public debates or other deliberative  devices to develop societal 
consensus on particular contested issues. In both areas French social scientists have been very 
active, and so it is possible for an outsider to use this work to provide a firm foundation of 
analysis. No primary research has been carried out for this paper, but it draws on 
conversations with some of the French researchers in these fields, to back up the range of 
published worki.  The paper rests on the broader foundations of the work carried out on major 
infrastructure planning across Europe, which included a French case study and interviews 
with experts in several sectors, carried out in 2009-2010ii.The article does not try to assess the 
French system as a whole, though a full account would of course need to attempt that. The 
focus here is largely on the deliberative dimensions of infrastructure policy and decision 
making. Those wishing to find background on these aspects missing here will find more in 
Marshall (2012, 2014). 
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Deliberative theory 
 
Planners and planning theorists are very familiar with many decades of discussion of public 
participation, and, for at least 20 years, with the whole field of collaborative and 
communicative planning (Healey 1997, 2007, Innes and Booher 2004).  In these areas, there 
is both developed theory and a massive international swathe of empirical studies.  There has 
been less engagement with the area of deliberative theory, a key field of advance in political 
science since about 1990 (Chappell 2012, Dryzek 1990, 2000, Goodin 2008).  However some 
examination of the wider possibilities of deliberation in planning has occurred, most fully in 
studies on experience in Australia (Hopkins 2010a, 2010b, Legacy 2012, Maginn 2007), 
especially the “Dialogue with the city” in Perth in 2003-4.   Hopkins in particular has 
demonstrated the considerable potential pitfalls involved, if politicians, or planners, do not 
wish to genuinely open up decision making.  Vigar (2006) raised the same issue in analysing 
the attempt to widen discussion on regional transport planning in north east England. He 
proposed a three way analytical split of political, technical-rational and collaborative 
approaches to planning decision making, and noted how difficult it can be to get away from a 
mix of political and expert decision making.  This recent work has also raised the issue of the 
differential capability of the wider public to participate in such deliberation to real effect.  
These dimensions are critical in any discussion of the value and practicality of deliberation, 
in planning or in other fields, and they will be discussed at the end of this account. 
 
 
Early deliberative theory was on “micro deliberation”, looking at the range of techniques or 
procedures that might be deployed – citizens juries, deliberative polling, planning cells.  
Since around 2000 the emphasis has shifted to whether there is scope to “scale up” the 
deliberative approach, to mid level or macro deliberation.  Given that micro deliberative 
approaches are likely to be more familiar to readers (if not, try Chappell 2012), the main 
discussion here will be on this most recent phase of thinking, on deliberative systems.  Whilst 
much of French practice is not at that macro scale, some is, and the play across between the 
recent deliberative theory debates (largely in the Anglo-Saxon academic world) and French 
practice is particularly interesting.   
 
Deliberative systems 
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Most recently this topic has been fully explored by theorists in a collection edited by 
Parkinson and Mansbridge (2012).  This builds especially on work by the two editors 
(Mansbridge 1999, Parkinson 2006).  It tackles essentially the question of scale.  It is broadly 
accepted that it may be useful to use micro deliberative approaches at certain times, even 
though the weight these should have is always likely to be contested, on the grounds above 
all of representativeness.  What has been widely seen as less applicable in modern 
democracies, with millions of citizens, is how deliberation may help across a whole territory 
– city, region, country or even wider.   The latest discussion has aimed to modify these 
doubts.  This has been done by two moves. One argues that it is possible to “reason together” 
at wide scales if we loosen the requirements for what “reason” and “together” mean.  Claims 
can be made, narratives created and contested, by using contemporary forms of 
communication, even if the classic forms of debate, especially face to face debate, cannot be 
used.  The second move is to see systems of deliberation.  These systems bundle together or 
sequence sets of deliberative elements, some possibly small scale, some very large scale, so 
that, perhaps in a rather rough and ready way, the whole adds considerable value to the 
evolving of the public sphere around issues.  Part of such deliberation may take place in 
conventional arenas, such as parliaments or local councils, or within constitutionally 
recognised processes, such as elections or referendums.  But the distinctive element of 
deliberative systems thinking is to see these as part of a wider package or dynamic of 
political and public policy evolution, linked to other more innovative ingredients.  Those 
ingredients may include some of the micro deliberative devices, or scaled up elements such 
as large scale public debating exercises, as will be described later using French examples. 
 
Deliberative theorists raise a whole range of issues on how far macro deliberation can really 
work (see particularly the first and last chapters in Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012).  These 
include how well sequences of deliberative devices can be linked together (answer, get 
politicians and officials to be more conscious of the ordering of deliberative moments 
throughouta policy process), how to overcome the “deliberative gap” between what citizens 
want and what governments can offer (answer, aim for “richly representative” deliberative 
systems), how to ensure fair access in discussion (answer, set up systems with “tribunes” or 
“umpires” institutionally arranged to work for neutrality).  The French cases here can be seen 
to be struggling in their practical development with these issues, with for example the public 
debates system acting very much in such an umpire role.  It would need more space than is 
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available to draw out these connections between the deliberative literature and the French 
experience fully and explicitly, but readers will it is hoped be able to see how links can be 
made. 
 
A further issue is the question of “repeat deliberation”, where reflection may be an option at 
different stages of the development of a project or strategy. This may be related to the 
separate stages of policy making: agenda setting (defining a problem), discussing, deciding 
and implementing (Catt 1999).  The new twist from deliberation is to imagine how processes 
of deliberation may be brought in at various points of this sequence. This can overlap with 
the idea of the “policy funnel”, which has been used to suggest that different scope to frame 
problems exists at each of these moments.  Whilst the idea of a linear policy process has been 
challenged repeatedly (Barrett and Fudge 1981 on implementation theory for example), it is 
unlikely that the validity of such phased policy making can ever be completely removed.  In 
simple terms, deliberative approaches in the public realm are likely to fit most 
straightforwardly in the first two stages (agenda setting and discussing).  The classic 
complication for planners is that agreements made there may not stick later when individual 
projects come into view. That then gives scope for further deliberation at that stage, if the 
system allows such “re-opening” of matters of principle – as many systems do, in some 
degree or another, for a range of reasons – finance, power, changing contexts and so on.  We 
will come back to the repeat deliberation issue at the end. 
 
Evolving work on representation is very relevant to thinking on deliberation. Saward (2010) 
argues that representation should be thought about in a much broader manner, as a process of 
claim making and audience creation.  Whilst the standard machinery of electoral democracy 
can be analysed in these terms, there are, he suggests, many other actors who successfully 
claim to represent other people or other arguments. These people or groups may claim to 
“speak for” interests, and if their claim is seen as valid by certain audiences or constituencies, 
this contributes to a panorama of representation which goes far beyond the classic discussion 
of how a member of a parliament represents electors.  Saward uses examples such as Western  
celebrities (e.g. Bono on Africa) claiming to speak for the poor of Africa. Macro deliberation 
can draw some support from this concept of representation, because it can fit in a landscape 
of continuous construction of the public sphere (Habermas 1996), without challenging the 
legitimacy of representative democracy.  The wider concept of representation claims that 
there are multiple bases of legitimacy in a complex contemporary polity.  Electorally based 
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representation is still likely to be at the core of any democratic polity, but it fits in this wider 
landscape, so legitimacies are not in reality competing, but overlapping and complementary.  
The evolution of French practice can be interpreted as a real world drive towards such 
enriching and deepening of democratic politics, and planning has been a leading element of 
such emerging practice over 20 or 30 years. 
 
French policy making and politics since the 1990s: infrastructure, environment and 
planning in their political context 
 
Many readers will not know a great deal about French political evolution since the 1990s, so 
a brief sketch is given here, concentrating on the areas which are of most relevance to the 
zone of planning major infrastructure, the substantive area behind this exploration.  The 
French polity has been a fairly turbulent one, with continual oscillation in complex forms 
between right and left leaning governments, and many other currents running underneath this 
governmental flux (Cole 2008, Cole et al 2008 and 2013, Culpepper et al 2006).  Three 
groups of changes are perhaps most critical. First, neoliberalisation has changed profoundly 
the spheres of action of the state, reducing public control and increasing the veto power of 
international companies, French private corporations, and threats from international financial 
forces.  Nevertheless some of the interlocking strength of state and business interests remains, 
giving the state significant holds for steering policy in a number of fields.  Second, scalar 
change in the polity has been continuous, with regional and local governing ensembles 
gaining power relative to the central state apparatus, and considerable Europeanisation 
affecting all these authorities’ modes of operation.  Third, there is a partially autonomous 
continuing drive for democratisation in a wider sense than allowed by the changes above.  
This has been one of the forces pushing regionalisation and localisation, but also presses on 
the behaviour of all governing actors, encouraging an innovative approach to participation 
and deliberation. 
 
The Conseil d’État has for several years been in the forefront of exploring more open and 
democratic approaches to managing the business of governing.  This body is a sort of 
watchdog of the state, established in 1810, whose tasks include ensuring that government 
practice is constitutional and takes due account of the principles of fair law making – 
including importantly now the principles evolving in juridical practice in European and other 
international forums.  Since 2010 it has held many meetings and produced three reports on 
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the scope for expanding deliberative approaches and behaviours throughout government at all 
levels and across many policy fields (Conseil d’État 2011, 2012, 2013, also Sauve 2013).  It 
is pointed out that the first French sphere of mandated participatory practice was in the 1985 
planning law (loi d’urbanisme).  But the area which has been taken as virtually the template 
for the desirable new model for the French state is the procedure developed since the 1990s to 
deal with major infrastructure projects.  The centre piece of this procedure is the Commission 
Nationale du Débat Public (CNDP), created under a Gaullist government by the Loi Barnier 
in 1995, strengthened by a Socialist government in 2002, and further reformed by the 
Sarkozy government in 2010.  A fuller account of how the work of this body has evolved will 
be given below.  The point here is to emphasise the emblematic quality that this evolving 
practice has been given by the Conseil d’État.  Certain features of the CNDP’s way of 
operation have been highlighted, and promoted as the principles which governments should 
move towards.  Another practice given prominence in the Conseil’s arguments is the 
developing tendency to hold national, or on occasion regional or local, debates, on matters of 
contention or of critical public interest. The most prominent of these has been the Grenelle of 
2007, which to some extent institutionalised a way of bringing together different societal 
interests in a semi corporatist way.  Again more detail will be given below, but it is striking 
how it has been in the fields of planning, infrastructure and the environment that these 
emerging deliberative tools have been most evident.  It looks like these developments may 
affect the next reforms of state behaviour in the coming years. 
 
How then did the institutional innovations come to materialise, within the force field of the 
pressures described above?  The answer for the major infrastructure field is that a change of 
state practice was virtually forced in the later 1980s and 1990s by the massive opposition to 
the preferred schemes of state action, above all for rail lines, with the LGV (Ligne de Grande 
Vitesse) Mediterranée down the Rhone Valley being the final straw which stimulated the 
invention of a new early public discussion procedure (the Circulaire Bianco of 1992), which 
itself led fairly directly to the Loi Barnier.   So it was societal conflict, above all at a local 
level, which led the state to take a step back and suggest early debating processes for 
eventually all large infrastructure schemes.  This was related to the pressures described 
above, because the field of policy making had been complicated considerably by the 
decentralisation reforms of the 1980s, weakening the single mindedness of the state structure.   
Increasingly all schemes have to be negotiated diagonally across national, regional and local 
levels, with finance in due course coming from each as well.  Equally neoliberalisation was 
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already beginning to drain away resources from the state, leaving projects for rail, road and 
energy increasingly slowed and more contestable.  At the same time, the French green 
movement had been developing its strength gradually since the 1970s, and by the 1990s was 
a clear force able to articulate competing arguments at all levels, even if its political parties 
were rarely able to develop the governing leverage seen in Germany.  The pluralisation of the 
French polity thus impacted on this field, and generated policy innovation. 
 
The Commission Nationale du Débat Public (CNDP) 
 
As described above, this body is now nearly 20 years old and has gradually grown in 
competences, experience and legitimacy.  It was modelled to a significant degree on a body 
created in Quebec in 1978, which considers the environmental impacts of major public 
investment schemes, the Bureau d’audiences publiques sur l’environnement (BAPE).  So far 
it has not been imitated elsewhere, although in Italy a law has been prepared to create a 
similar institution, which may or may not be passed in due course.    Here the discussion will 
be developed in the following steps.  First a bald description is given of how the CNDP 
works, taking post 2002 practice as the norm.  Secondly, an initial discussion follows of the 
achievements and limits which have marked its history to date.  Then some fuller analysis is 
given of how the CNDP’s work sits in the wider public policy and planning landscape, using 
the results of a major recent academic study of its work over many years in one French 
region, that of Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (PACA).  All this will remain relatively 
summary, given the broad goals of this article, but it is hoped that some introduction will thus 
be available for English speaking readers. 
 
It is worth bearing in mind that the CNDP experience relates to both participatory and 
deliberative strands of democratic thinking, as should become clear in the following sections. 
So although this paper is primarily about deliberative dimensions, the cross over to 
“traditional” participatory concerns is strong.  We return to this point briefly after the CNDP 
case studies have been analysed. 
 
The CNDP regime, as it exists since the reforms of 2002, can be described simply under a 
small set of headline points (the CNDP website has a full range of information, including a 
section in English; see also the extensive collection by Revel et al 2007, as well as Subra 
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2008,  Delaunay 2008, Manas 2012).    For French speaking readers, a brief quote is given in 
an end note, to give more of a flavour of the legislators’ ambitions.iii 
 
• The CNDP is an independent, state financed public body, made up of a balanced 
membership of at present 25 members, drawn from a range of backgrounds, including 
government at central and local level (15), and representatives of NGOs, unions and 
business (10).  The Commission meets monthly to decide all key matters, on the 
advice of its only full time members, a president and two vice presidents.  The 
presidents have come from the traditional engineering civil servant milieux, normally 
from an École des Ponts et Chaussées training, whilst the vice presidents have had 
more varied backgrounds, with most recently an academic being appointed as one in 
2013. 
• All projects over certain size thresholds have to be offered for consideration by the 
CNDP.  This should occur long before the project has been detailed, so that the CNDP 
can discuss the overall principle and location of the project.  The normal process of 
public inquiry (enquête public) will deal with the consenting issues when all has been 
detailed, normally many years later.  This public inquiry process is broadly similar to 
those known for many decades in the UK, and deals with thousands of projects each 
year, large and small, to establish that they are of public value and can go ahead.  The 
2002 law also allows for the CNDP to organise public debates on major public issues, 
at the request of the government, but this has been little used, with ministers 
preferring to control their own debating initiatives. 
• The CNDP can accept or decline to set up a process to consider the projects offered, 
and if it accepts, it can either set up its own commission (a Commission Particulière 
du Débat  Public, CPDP) to manage the process, or ask the developer to arrange a 
public debate, with the CNDP having an oversight role.  The CPDP team is made up 
of several members, depending on the complexity of the project. 
• The public debate process can last a maximum of four months, taking place in the 
locality or localities of the project.  It is prepared by several months of preparatory 
work by the CPDP, which aims to broaden interest and involvement to the maximum 
extent, and ensure that the developer is fully cooperative. All participants are given 
help to produce leaflets, on the same basis, so that a small local grouping has the right 
to have a leaflet of its case published by the CPDP, of the same length and quality as 
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that produced by the developer.  The developer, however, which is paying for the 
public debate process, will naturally produce a great deal of its own material, and is 
likely to have far more support, given that the CNDP has itself a very limited budget, 
which does not normally run to supporting less resourced groups, other than via 
publicity and via the meetings it manages. 
• The public debate consists above all of public meetings held during the four month 
period, but these will be backed by websites and a range of publicity processes, 
including sometimes inset elements, like in one case a citizens jury. 
• At the end of the four months, the CPDP simply prepares a report on what came out 
of the process, without indicating any view on the project.  The developer must then 
respond to this report within three months, explaining how it expects to proceed, 
given the public debate outcomes and the CPDP report.  The CNDP then has some 
role as a guarantor of any promises made at this stage by the developer, and should in 
principle continue to follow the process, in relation to these commitments, through to 
the public inquiry or beyond.  This role however stretches the resources of the CNDP, 
and depends very much on the degree of activeness of the CPDP presidents in each 
case. 
Sixty four projects were subject to public debate between 2002 and 2014, spread around all 
regions of France and many sectors, though transport projects have been much the most 
common type.  There were very few projects under the pre-2002 arrangements, which left the 
decision to hold a public debate more up to the developer, but since then there has been a 
steady flow, only interrupted by periods of national elections when activity has tended to dry 
up. The great majority have been normal CPDPs, with only five allocated to the developer to 
organise, and three instances of using the CNDP to organise a thematic public debate (on 
radioactive waste, on the transport future for the Rhone valley and Languedoc arc, and on 
nanotechnologies). The composition of the CNDP is regularly reviewed, with now a third set 
of president and vice presidents in place.  Considerable development of practice has taken 
place over the years, with the institutionalisation of procedures taking formal shape in the 
Cahiers de Méthodologie, first prepared in 2004, and now in their third edition.  However 
each project is taken as unique and CPDPs are encouraged to innovate as needed to fit the 
circumstances of project, locality and timing.  
 
The values and limits of the CNDP – an initial commentary 
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There is no large literature on the CNDP system and what follows in this section draws on 
earlier writing (Marshall 2012, 2014) and research and commentary provided there, as well as 
more up to date examination of the full details of how the system works (including on all the 
debates held and on finance and administrative aspects: this can be easily accessed on the 
extensive CNDP webpages).  Sceptical outsiders may look at the process, and doubt if it 
really makes any difference.  That is a judgement which, as French researchers have shown, 
is by no means easy to make.  There has certainly been a considerable input of resources, 
creativity and learning into the 18 year journey.  The current annual budget of the CNDP, 
falling to central taxation, is around £1 million for the CNDP central operation, and around 
£2 million for the elements of CPDPs which are not paid for by others (largely by the 
developer).  Whilst small compared with any of the project budgets being examined, there 
must be added to this the amounts paid by the developers, mostly semi-public or public 
actors, even if like the rail infrastructure body RFF, they have a commercial form.  For a 
typical project, this cost may come to £1 million.  So the financial resources are significant, if 
not vast.  Many other actors invest large amounts of time and money in the process as well, 
especially local authorities and NGOs.  All these actors have developed ways of managing 
the process, above all the large transport and energy infrastructure providers in rail, road and 
electricity.  All of these have set up special divisions just to deal with public debates, with 
social scientists working alongside communications experts.  So this range of inputs shows 
immediately that the institution has made a considerable difference to the process of planning 
major infrastructure, in changing behaviour of key actors.  The developers now know that this 
will be an essential step in their planning process, and seek to use it to their best advantage.  
Many have it seems concluded that they must operate as the law intended them to operate, 
with considerable openness and transparency, ready to discuss anything and answer anything. 
 
Important though this set of effects is, those outside France tend to ask only one thing: what 
difference has the process made to outcomes?  Business interests may see it as an unwelcome 
hurdle to obtaining consents, and some radical environmentalists see it as primarily a way of 
massaging through projects which would otherwise have been stopped by means of direct 
action or campaigning, so impacting on political decisions.  Others may suggest that the 
public inquiry process could have been improved, to avoid the need for this stage, often 
detached by many years from actual implementation.  There is no doubt that public 
opposition to projects squeezed open the process. In the 1990s the intention was that the 
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principle of development would not be open for discussion, only the route options, the ways 
of meeting identified demand. However it became obvious in the earliest public debates held 
that this line could not be held.  CPDPs were quite clear that the only way to run the public 
debates was to allow full discussion of principles, and this was conceded in the rewording in 
the 2002 law.  So there is a very clear unpredictability about the French system, which is now 
built in.  
 
Developers can attempt to brazen out a public debate where it is evident that many 
dimensions of the project are heavily challenged, but most have not reacted that way.   Data 
on developers reactions has been collected, even if this has a significant element of 
interpretation. Broadly, the data show that of the 61 projects 2002-2012, 17 maintained the 
project roughly as proposed, 38 made modifications to the project (including 25 who chose a 
new option which appeared during the public debate), and 6 abandoned the project 
completely (Commission Nationale du Débat Public 2013).  However this is only a very 
rough and ready gauge of effect on outcomes, even if it does appear to show that the public 
debates element on its own can matter to the fate of projects.  Developers use the process as 
one part of their planning process and we can be fairly certain that the system must now 
impact on that process fully. Anyone looking at options (new construction or not, this route 
or that, this technology or that) will in part have in mind the public debate opportunity (or 
threat) at for example year 3 in a 10 year route to construction. Of course the public debate is 
only one part of the equation, with financing and shifts in demand often far outweighing this 
moment on a multi-year track.  But the difference from the system instituted by the UK 
reforms of 2008 to 2013 is very evident, in that no national policy statement system exists in 
France to give developers more certainty: in the UK (England and Wales) this removes the 
discussion of principles from the consenting stage. In France, uncertainty exists and is 
worked with. Whether this difference is seen as positive or negative depends on the 
perspectives and aims of people judging the system. 
 
Supporters of the CNDP point to the way in which it has broadened the democratic 
components of governing – this is the core of the case of the Conseil d’État.  This argument 
says, with deliberative political theory, that there is value in talking, in exposing to the 
brightest light these important decisions that affect the public realm.  Deliberative theory is 
clear that at some point the talking will stop, and decision making will occur.  The CNDP 
was deliberately separated from the decision making, and that, as we will see later in the case 
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discussion, presents tensions as well as offering opportunities.  The fact that there is no 
definite judgement from anyone – CPDP, public, developer - at this stage allows a more open 
approach by the developer, who may well be some way from a preferred option, and can be 
genuinely exploratory, at least in some respect, in the public debate phase.  The CPDP team 
has as its main goal, not coming to a final view, but exploring every dimension that it regards 
as important, and enabling all sorts of publics to have their say, learn and pursue their goals, 
including after the debate has ended.  Thus supporters see this as having a “school of 
democracy” role, as has often been claimed for participatory elements of any kind. 
 
The tensions however appear in a more difficult light when the relative powerlessness of the 
CPDP is spotlighted.  Local interests frequently complain that the promises of developers 
made at public debates can easily be lost several years later, given that the CNDP’s guarantor 
role is often not resourced in such a way as to have real binding power.  In reality, the 
majority of schemes are likely to go ahead, even if partially reframed and amended.  The 
detachment in time of the debate from the final scheme and moment of public inquiry may be 
so large that interests lose the connections in the trajectory of public decision making.  There 
have been suggestions that the CNDP should be given more teeth to address this aspect, but 
opponents argue that this would lose much of the open and democratic quality that now can 
flourish in the debates.  We will explore further in the final section these tensions. 
 
Public debates within the overall trajectory of policy making for territories: the PACA 
example 
 
The region in southern France of Provence-Alpes-Cote d’Azur (normally shortened to 
PACA) covers the eastern part of the Mediterranean area, alongside the region of Languedoc-
Roussillon to the west.  Several important public debates have taken place in the region, and 
in 2012 a research study by French social scientists was completed, examining this 
experience over a 15 year period (Fourniau et al 2012). The special feature of the study, 
coming on top of many treatments of individual debate episodes, was to put the debates 
within their territorial and temporal contexts.  The aim was to reveal the reach and flow 
(portée is the key word in French) of debates, which have often been interacting one with 
another, and certainly playing into other planning and public policy processes going on at the 
same time.  Only a very slight flavour of the rich material in the study can be given, and this 
will be done by focussing on two cases.  There is no intention to present cases which can be 
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generalised to “prove” something about the French system as a whole.  The researchers who 
worked on the PACA cases were also looking for (and found) illumination on the nature of 
the CNDP system, when examined within one region of France, without any expectation that 
this would cover the spectrum of debates across the whole country and across different 
periods.  In particular I use these cases to explore what arguments play around cases like this, 
by mentioning what potential supporters and critics might say. This is not based on particular 
comments by particular individuals within the French academic or wider discussions, but is 
used as a presentational device to bring out the issues which observers could reasonably raise 
when viewing these cases. 
 
Boutre-Carros 
 
The electricity transmission line proposed in the Verdon has been long argued by EDF as 
essential for making the Nice area free of the risk of power cuts (see Figure 1).  Attempts at 
public discussion had run through the 1990s.  The 120 kilometres long line from Boutre to 
Carros had been opposed by many, especially nature protection interests who had fought for 
the making of a natural park (Parc Natural Régional, PNR).  It then became one of the first 
public debates, and was seen as a success for the new system. The public debate in 1998 
allowed the emergence of a consensus around a set of measures for “improving” the 
countryside and the region, as compensation for the construction of a project which was 
significantly changed in order to reduce its impact, with the signing of a protocol in 2001.  
However when it came to the public inquiry in 2004, this consensus had fallen away.  
Approval was given, but this was challenged, and finally in 2006 the Conseil d’État annulled 
the consent, on the grounds that the need for improvement of the electricity system could not 
be allowed to overrule the protection given by the natural area designation.  Since then, the 
scheme has not been resurrected, though some expect the continuing system problems in the 
Nice region to cause the scheme to reappear at some point in the future. 
 
This case is an interesting one, as it allows strongly diverging interpretations. The supporters 
of the transmission scheme argue that the public debate proved itself useless, and probably 
counter productive, in that without the appearance of consensus having been achieved, the 
scheme might have been pushed through over ten years ago, even if against some opposition.  
They point to the very tangled politics of the region, with much of the struggle around the 
scheme having always been tied up with right versus left fights in the area, particularly 
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associated with some strong political figures.  The public debate system could be seen, with 
hindsight, as unable to “master” the politics of the area in a societally beneficial manner, with 
all the tortuously negotiated steps, over so many years, incapable of finding a solution. 
 
Supporters of the public debates system, and opponents of the scheme, would see things very 
differently.  They might argue that Boutre-Carros shows precisely the value of such a system, 
which allows fundamental discussion out in the open, with a previously very powerful and 
determined developer like EDF obliged to come down to the level of local interests and argue 
its case.  They would say that taking a long time to work through the need and elaborate 
alternatives, including those which in a sense had nothing to do with the scheme (a whole raft 
of regional support measures), allowed the real issues to become clear. If this, as in this case, 
meant that the no construction option was the final winner, that does not invalidate the 
system. Over a wide range of projects, this outcome is far from the most common one, but 
should be seen as a fair result, balanced by many other schemes which go ahead. Detailed 
study of such years-long trajectories shows that the end result is formed by a complex of 
factors, with local and regional politics at the forefront.  In a democratic polity, the 
crystallising out of such factors is good, even if sometimes some developments which are 
apparently in some wider public interest do not take place.  This is only, supporters might 
argue, what happens all the time in planning and politics more generally, where strong local 
veto interests can stop developments all the time (think of any high income urban or rural 
area). The difference here is that the CNDP system inserts time and opportunity for some 
interests which do not normally have the resources or rights to have an influential say. 
 
Certainly the researchers of this case show the complexities of the evolving and cross cutting 
effects at work, with the supporting and opposing interest sets being reconfigured over the 
years, and the end result (so far) emerging almost unexpectedly from the intervention of the 
Conseil d’État (which is not at all in the habit of annulling schemes of this kind at such a late 
stage).  The message is that all sorts of aspects of such decision making can become messy 
and unpredictable.  The installation of the CNDP system can indeed stop the emergence of a 
neat and “rational from above” system of decision making, making decision making for 
powerful developers less predictable. But that, the researchers imply, is what a genuinely 
deliberative system should be doing. Another message is the very long run nature of some of 
these cases – only a view from history far into the future will show what will be the “final” 
end result. 
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LGV PACA 
 
The second case is the LGV PACA, the proposal to extend the high speed line from Avignon 
to Nice, making the journey from Paris to Nice similar in speed to that proposed elsewhere in 
France (see Figures 2 and 3).  This idea, present since the 1980s, had been dropped for the 
time being in 1991, given the enormous levels of conflict around the TGV Mediterranée.  
That line was resolved by 1995, and so RFF/SNCF returned with the proposal, mobilising 
regional interests in its favour. The public debate took place in 2004, and allowed the 
emergence of visions competing with those of the LGV proposal.  The public debate, both 
before, during and after, allowed all sorts of NGO and political interests in the region to make 
links and develop the case for a more regionally oriented project. The debate itself had 
pointed at some sort of regionalised version of a high speed route, which might achieve in 
some degree several of the most desired goals.  Many local and regional interests stressed the 
importance of investment in local rail systems, which had hardly been improved for a 
century, and they gave less priority to journey time from Paris. They also argued for a greater 
emphasis on east west links, prioritising the Mediterranean Arc, from Italy to Spain, rather 
than the Paris link.  Over the 2004 to 2011 period the researchers identified a “configuration” 
determined by the public debate.  They showed how the public debate had framed 
discussions, with all sorts of groupings, studies and discussion stages taking their cue from 
what was seen as a successful public debate.  However opposition to the very idea of a high 
speed line boiled up again in 2011, and the regional prefect said that the high speed line 
scheme should no longer be the aim, but a scheme of overall rail improvement instead. So we 
now seem to be in a post debate configuration.  At the time of writing, regional interests, 
alongside RFF, are mobilising again in favour of reformulating the case for a high speed line, 
fearful that if such a scheme is not on the national “rail shopping list”, PACA will lose out 
again to regions which have always had available and agreed schemes. 
 
Again in this case, we can imagine opponents of the CNDP system saying that in the end the 
apparently successful public debate has not been any use.  The debate did just what it was 
supposed to do, allowing early consideration of all the issues, not taking the principle of the 
scheme as read, but investigating alternatives, opening up new spaces of discussion and 
facilitating the creation of new alliances and narratives, which effectively led the process over 
the coming years. However, all this work seemed to be for nothing when opposition 
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reappeared in 2011, leaving a landscape of confusion and no regional or national plans to 
improve transport links at any scale.  Clearly, the strongest supporters of high speed rail are 
unlikely to be happy, but it may be argued that in this case, possibly as in Boutre-Carros, 
there was little chance of driving through a scheme against significant local opposition.  If 
public discussion, in whatever institutional form, had this outcome, that was what had to be, 
outside a political context like for example China, where an authoritarian system can overrule 
local opponents. 
 
In this case, though, the researchers make a clearer case for the value of the public debate 
system.  Viewed from a planning perspective, one significant element of the public debate 
configuration was the way in which planning going on in the localities was tied in to the LGV 
discussion.  The Agences d’Urbanisme of Marseille, Toulon and to an extent Nice were able 
to start cooperating on regional visions. All were involved, if to varying degrees, in sub-
regional planning exercises at this stage, with the preparation of the new round of SCOTs 
(Schéma de Cohérence Territorial). That for Toulon was especially critical, as one of the core 
debating points was whether the high speed line should cut straight across towards the Cote 
d’Azur and Nice, or incline southwards towards Toulon. The Toulon SCOT examined the 
implications of this question, and so placed this within a proper planning context, showing 
the effects on likely future urban development.  At a macro scale, the same sort of regional 
considerations were brought in by the formulation of the Mediterranean Arc narrative, 
emphasising the creation of a proper regional public transport system.  Without the opening 
given by the public debates system, little of this integration with local and regional issues, 
and the formation of the relevant political, professional and interest group alliances, would 
have been able to progress.  
 
It can be argued that, had this integration been encouraged further by more effective regional 
political and governing arrangements, the configuration formed from 2004 would have gelled 
into an effective resolution, rather than collapsing in political conflict and acrimony in 2011.  
From a regional planning perspective, the two regions (PACA and Languedoc-Roussillon) 
have needed to engage in cooperative regional planning, in order to present the state with 
adequate framing of spatial futures and investment needs. But both regions have been rather 
weak in regional planning terms, unable generally to cohere the demands of their often strong 
departments – a common problem in quite a few French regions.  PACA in particular has had 
little ability to sketch a coherent regional future, and even less capacity to work with 
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Languedoc-Roussillon, which has generally had rather more of a vision within its own 
region.  It is interesting that a public debate was held in 2006 on the transportation needs of 
the Rhone valley and Languedoc arc, to try to help to resolve conflicts over future road and 
rail schemes. But this, though valuable in some respects, seems to have been affected by the 
same issues of poor regional governance,, and did not fully succeed in resolving the state’s 
uncertainty about what to do in these regions. 
 
The two PACA cases 
 
These two cases are intended to give an idea of the complex effects of the French system, 
rather than promote an impression of a seamless progress towards a deliberative democratic 
model.  They are not intended to be typical cases: most projects have not been set back like 
this, but nevertheless the long timescales are not unusual. A great many of the projects 
subjected to public debates have not been implemented yet.  In significant part this is because 
of the crisis in French finances, which has slowed the more optimistic timetables of bodies 
like RFF and EDF.  This could possibly in due course cause real problems in the system, as 
ever longer gaps open up between the moment of public debate and the public inquiry, let 
alone actual construction.  However, this does not necessarily invalidate the principle of such 
a planning reform.  The overall view of the CNDP and the behaviour changes it has induced 
is highly positive in France, and there is no likelihood of it being removed or downgraded in 
the future – even though at moments MPs have been worried about any encroachment on 
parliamentary and government prerogatives, and so any strengthening of its powers is also 
somewhat unlikely in any near future. 
 
As mentioned above, the CNDP experience also relates very much to participatory theorising, 
although that is not the main emphasis here.  The meetings during the four month debate 
phases are classic face to face participatory experiences.  But this is seen here as one part of a 
bigger deliberative process, which then, when tied into other democratic and not so 
democratic political processes, might be seen as building up to be a deliberative system. 
 
The cases highlight two other important points, which connect to live discussions in 
deliberative theory.  One is their complete intertwining with other areas of public policy, 
particularly with other spheres of planning.  A planner cannot read the PACA case studies 
without seeing classic planning dilemmas, and also may feel that some of the difficulties 
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experienced with these cases are caused by inadequate strategic planning in the areas 
concerned.  This is a message for infrastructure planners everywhere – it is not a system that 
can sensibly separated off from other planning and investment processes.  The second point is 
closely related – that public debates fit into the normal play of politics of all kinds, both of 
parties and of interest groups (as Hendriks 2011 analyses well in some Australian cases).  
That is to say that deliberative politics is not a separate stream from “normal” politics.  We 
will come back to the characterisation of “deliberative systems” towards the end of this 
paper, but we can already see some queries that the French experience may raise in relation to 
that idea: does it catch the reality of political dynamics in real democracies, or abstract too 
much from that reality? 
 
Public thematic debates – the Grenelle 
 
For some years now, since at least the 1990s, national governments in France have 
occasionally used the technique of organising public debates on difficult issues (regional 
governments have also tried this - Gourgues 2010, 2012).  There is no system or rule on this, 
with the decision resting with ministers, and different terms being used for the exercise, and 
with debates endowed with widely differing status and reach.  Examples include those on 
health (1998-1999), road safety (2002), bioethics (2004) and school hours - which are set 
nationally - (2010).  In 2012-2013 a national debate on the energy transition took place, as the 
Socialist government sought to find a widely legitimate path for shifts in energy futures, 
including possible reductions in the role of nuclear power.  However much the most 
celebrated and doubtless important one has been the Grenelle de L’Environnement, set up by 
incoming President Sarkozy in 2007, as a result of a campaign promise. This resulted from 
the fact that a prominent ecologist had stood in the presidential elections and had publicly 
challenged all candidates to agree to such a public debate on the environment, which would 
bind the new government. With green votes seen as crucial, all candidates accepted, the 
ecologist left the race, and Sarkozy put special emphasis on this feature for the rest of the 
campaign. Here this example is used as a case study of this French practice, which is clearly 
bringing deliberative approaches into the heart of some governmental policy making.   
 
It is normal of course for such governmental directions to be set by party and governmental 
decisions, often by manifestos, or otherwise by internal discussion within the ruling coalition, 
under the pressure of pressure group action and all the rest of the features making up the 
21 
 
setting of agendas and deciding of policy streams (Kingdon 1995).  Deliberative theorists 
argue that deliberative approaches could usefully permeate many parts of governing, so that 
many different elements make up a system of deliberation.  In this case, we may see the 
Grenelle as the overarching element for setting environmental pathways, with streams which 
determined policy: green fiscal reform, environmental governance, energy use (especially in 
buildings) and policy on waste stand out especially. The projects end of the spectrum dealt 
with by the CNDP is far away in any putative sequencing of deliberative effort, but it can be 
seen as dimly connected along a long stream.  In the same way, in Britain the institution of 
National Policy Statements is part of a much tighter and harder sequence of policy making, 
setting the overall policy within which projects need to be considered – though in this case, 
there is no significant deliberative element, beyond the parliamentary committee discussions 
taking place and the normal reactive consultative opportunity given in most UK government 
policy processes. 
 
The particular way the Grenelle was structured is of interest.  It took the corporatist principle 
of creating five “colleges” representing central government, local government, business, 
employees, and NGOs, with each given equal weight, first in the policy making groups which 
made the core programme within a three month period and then in the working groups 
designed to detail and implement the programme over the following years. Thus the overall 
decision making body was a group of 40 strong, with eight representatives from each college. 
The process was supported and resourced by the deputy prime minister in charge of the 
newly created mega ministry covering all core environmental areas for the first time (energy, 
transport, ecology, planning etc), Jean-Louis Borloo.  Efforts were made to bring in the wider 
public, by arranging public debates around the country and creating websites to collect 
opinions and inform of progress, but it was generally agreed that this took secondary place to 
the core college system.  Within that system the environmental NGOs tended to have a 
special status, given the topic and the way the commitment had emerged, so that for the first 
time in France the big and relatively well resourced groups like France Nature 
Environnement became key insiders in the policy making process. 
 
We have the benefit of a full academic study of the Grenelle (Boy et al 2012), so that we 
know much about critical aspects, particularly how the exercise is now assessed, and what 
impacts it can be seen to have had (so far) on some of the central environmental portfolios.    
The essence of the account is to show that the impact depended very much on the state of 
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play around the particular topic.  In some cases, like the considerable push forwards given to 
policy on improving the energy efficiency of buildings, a strong impact could be identified.  
The same was true in the way that environmental governance mechanisms were reformulated, 
showing the movement of the environmental NGO complex into influential positions.  But if 
the policy instrumentation was already fairly robust, as in waste policy, the impact was much 
less, as was also the case with renewable energy, for different reasons.   What was clear, once 
an analysis included a medium term view, seeing the movement of policy in the preceding 
years, as well as the four years (at the time of the research) since the Grenelle’s inception, 
was that any major initiative of this kind could either get absorbed in the “normal” dynamics 
of policy making – political competition, interest group lobbying flows and so on – or could 
make a genuinely new configuration, and so reframe an issue.  Given that the Grenelle, in this 
deliberative case, was ambitious and spanned in effect several sectors of policy, and so 
numerous policy communities and variants of political salience, it is not surprising that the 
impact was so variable. 
 
What might be less expected by some sceptical about the role of such macro deliberative 
episodes, was that the researchers found quite clearly that the Grenelle was positively viewed 
by all those who had participated or who had been close to it.  This was not a starry eyed 
view that everything had changed.  These were experienced hands in politics, who were quite 
aware that much that had been promised had fallen by the political wayside – the 
abandonment of the carbon tax by the UMP government in 2010 was the most critical loss of 
a Grenelle agreed result.  But this did not reduce significantly these people’s assessment of 
the worthwhile nature of the Grenelle, or make them say that further runs of such initiatives 
should be avoided.  The analysts were highly aware of the special features of the Grenelle in 
terms of the political juncture, how well it fitted a range of interests with power, and that this 
conjuncture continued long enough for some concrete results to emerge.  So this case does 
not tell us that macro deliberative initiatives, of this kind (it is of course only one particular 
variety, with a range of features specific to it, such as the collegiate structure and broad but 
focussed agenda) will necessarily or probably be valuable.  The message is precisely that 
these initiatives may work at some moments and not at others, depending on the  political 
conjuncture, on the nature of the  policy sectors: this cannot be catalogued in terms of a list of 
conditions under which the use of public debates will be beneficial or not, because the variety 
of episodes and contexts is far too large for that.  Finding the relevant moment would always 
need political acuity and timing, with strong political champions.  
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Macro deliberation, if it is to make a difference, must be fully aware of its insertion in 
“normal” politics – and that would mean a generation of politicians emerging who were used 
to employing macro deliberative techniques of various kinds, but perhaps especially these big 
debate approaches, as part of the tool box of being a national (or regional, or city) politician. 
Given the number of debates which have been held in France since the 1990s, and the push of 
the Conseil d’État, it may be that such an accumulation of experience and political reflexes is 
indeed being established.  It is worth summarising the modest programme of the Conseil 
d’État, in its promotion of a “deliberative administration”, drawing above all on CNDP 
experience.  It proposed six principles which should guide new practices (Conseil d’État 
2011, pp 87-89): 
• Guarantee access to information 
• Ensure the receipt and proper use of observations received 
• Make certain the impartiality of the organiser of the debate element, by use if 
necessary of a separated and empowered referee (“tiers garant”) 
• Ensure reasonable periods for citizens to express themselves 
• Make sure that the composition of those consulted is selected according to rules of 
overall representativeness 
• Feed back the results of the exercise, in a time period appropriate to the importance of 
the issue. 
These may not seem very demanding, but interpreted in a broad way, they would make a 
significant difference to even ordinary governing practice. What the Conseil d’État report 
advocates would hardly be a deliberative system, but could constitute steps forward which 
might make a better functioning polity – and so, as planners have long argued, better 
functioning planning. Time will tell how far this goes.   
 
 
Concluding discussion 
 
We have surveyed some quite differing phenomena in the France of the last two decades.  
The CNDP is concerned largely with the project, on the ground, end of infrastructure 
questions, and is an instrument which uses public debating in a relatively classic, face to face 
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form.  The macro deliberative drive of initiatives like the Grenelle is a very different animal, 
even if it can equally be placed under the participatory and to an extent deliberative drift of 
the French state in the last 20 or 30 years.  Neither phenomenon could have taken place in 
these forms anywhere but France – but similar devices could perfectly well be considered 
elsewhere, suitably adapted and inserted.  How can we characterise these phenomena in 
relation to the deliberative theorising we discussed earlier? 
 
Deliberative theorists are aware that they are moving on to difficult ground when they talk of 
deliberative systems.  Such an idea of a collection, sequence or flow of deliberative devices is 
not easy to square with the observation of the normal functioning of political systems.  Issues 
of timing, power and complexity all intrude on any neat system functioning.  Planning theory 
has also struggled with these questions of the right moments for making key decisions. The 
CNDP is aware of precisely this issue, with one of its booklets discussing the right moment to 
hold public debates on projects: not too early (or the project will be too unspecified for 
interests to engage with) and not too late (or everything will be set and effectively decided).  
So it may be easy to imagine deliberative systems in the abstract, but tougher to see how, in a 
particular policy field (as here with major infrastructure fields - both the broad principles and 
particular projects) a reasonable balance of elements can make up a well functioning 
deliberative system.  One of the hints from these cases is the role that particular devices play 
in a broader flow (seeing the CNDP public debates as one such democratic device – Saward 
2003).  The theorists of the PACA public debates saw the actual debate moment as forming a 
sort of focus or catalyst, generating often a long “configuration” within the whole history of 
the case.  The sometimes enduring force of deliberative devices in this way is worthy of 
attention, and builds bridges to the zone of political science characterising policy making 
through framing and narrative building (Hajer 1995, Hajer and Wagenaar 2003, Schon and 
Rein 1994). 
 
A particular issue is that of “repeat deliberation”.  There is no doubt that, to give access at the 
multiple moments that a project or strategy may come on to the public’s radar, more than one 
“bite of the cherry” may well be necessary, so that governors can say that adequate 
deliberation has occurred.  Exercises like the Grenelle are a long way “upstream”, whilst the 
CNDP project stage is further along but still far before the formal decision moment, which is 
marked by an often less fully developed deliberative moment. So the French system does 
incorporate the chance for the public to intervene at several stages.  Some element of 
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funnelling towards the final approach and scheme must be present, but the scope for 
complicating movements back and forth is there, and this can, as the PACA examples show, 
lead to some frustration and delay for keen project promoters, developers who just want to 
get on with development. 
 
A further critical issue raised by recent work, as discussed at the start, is that of differential 
capacities of participants to join in effectively.  The cases reported here do not offer a great 
deal extra on this question, as they were not looking at the micro detail of particular 
exercises, where one can detect whether this is an issue and how organisers try to confront it 
(or not).  However the whole CNDP approach and mentality is intensely focused on helping 
participants, by working well in advance of formal sessions with local actors, to develop their 
confidence, to give material help with writing leaflets explaining their cases, to commission 
expert studies to support their arguments where they do not have the resources to do this, and 
so on.  This is not relevant to the macro exercises like the Grenelle, where those involved are 
experts from NGOs, trade unions or business, and differential capacity is not an issue – 
another of the advantages of this sort of model, which draws on the skills built up within 
wider society and gives a formalised opening for these forces to come right into 
governmental arenas. 
Much more could be said about how the big picture framing dimensions of politics (such as 
an energy transition, or a move towards some new transport settlement) may interact with the 
evolution of decisions on key projects in these fields.  The interaction is critical over time.  
Fights locally, however mediated or institutionalised, will often tend to press for resolution 
higher in the system. This was demonstrated in the case of the SNIT, the Schéma National 
des Infrastructures de Transport, an overall transport plan formulated as part originally of the 
Grenelle.  This idea had come from the difficulties the transport minister had been having in 
deciding schemes in Provence (connected too to the public debate mentioned above on the 
Rhone corridor and Languedoc arc).  This had pushed him in 2005-6 to think that making an 
overarching long term strategy would make sense.  For the first time this schéma was to be 
truly multi-modal and to cover maintenance and management issues as well as new 
investment.    The key in France has been to move forward on both fronts, local and national, 
exploring, experimenting, but generally within a democratising ethos. Other countries have 
taken other tracks, which can therefore not be used for thinking through the potentials of the 
construction of deliberative systems.  In relation to that theorising, the cases here suggest that 
“system” may be a word with too much integrating or cohering force to it.  A rather 
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comprehensive constitutional reform might steer politics and administration in a direction 
with more of that systemic character.  This could happen in one field (one might argue it is 
emerging in the main big infrastructure zone, by some sort of historical accident), or it could 
be advocated across all policy fields.   But short of such an overarching reform, deliberative 
devices will be snaking into and amongst the normal power and lobbying politics of the 
current polities.  We may suggest that this in itself can make a difference, though a much 
fuller study of the French case would be needed to give empirical foundations for such a 
claim.  That in turn would point to a conclusion that we might be looking for rather a 
deliberative democratic drive and trajectory, affecting perhaps gradually more areas of state 
policy, but by no means displacing political business as usual – or equally planning business 
as usual.  The deliberative systems idea might be superceded by a more messy accretive 
concept, of the gradual “deliberatisation” of polities. 
 
The broad messages of the case studies can be summarised as follows: 
 
A  that a broad commitment to deliberative democratisation may be widely supported.  The 
French body politic has, overall, welcomed the innovations described here, with the CNDP 
now institutionalised to a large extent (though reforms may happen), and the big national 
debates approach also now probably becoming established as part of the reportoire for 
governments, of perhaps all colours;   
 
B  but that there is nothing neat and straightforward about how either of these two sets of 
devices fits in with and interacts with all the rest of the multifarious “normal” working of 
French politics and administration.  The CNDP’s debates may move along discussion and 
facilitate the making (or occasionally radical change or abandonment) of big projects, but 
sometimes the complexities of political and historical circumstances may frustrate the 
benefits that might be obtained.  The variety of sectors, challenges and insertions in local and 
national politics may almost guarantee this diversity of impacts.  The same applies in the big 
national debates field. Although the survey here has been limited to just one case, the 
especially important Grenelle, it is likely that the conclusions of the research project on that 
case would be replicated in other cases.  After all, we would be used to this idea with other 
parts of the democratic tool box.  Elections do not always resolve log jams, or deep societal 
conflict. Referendums may not result in steps forward or improve the legitimacy of what one 
side or another was seeking.  Multi-level democracy, using local, regional and national 
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articulations of democratic forms, may not help the functioning of all policy fields – and of 
course these articulations vary enormously across countries, in terms of centralisation, 
decentralisation and so on.  Equally, multi-level deliberation will not necessarily solve 
problems on its own. But it may be a valuable addition to every government’s repertoire. 
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Figure 1 
 
Location of Boutre Carros scheme in southern France (source Fourniau J M and team 2012) 
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Figure 2 
High speed line in PACA, options in 2005 and 2011 (source Fourniau J M and team 2012) 
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Figure 3 
Links between spatial planning and high speed rail lines in southern France (source Fourniau 
J M and team 2012)   
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iii « Art. L. 121-1. - La Commission nationale du débat public, autorité administrative 
indépendante, est chargée de veiller au respect de la participation du public au processus 
d’élaboration des projets d’aménagement ou d’équipement d’intérêt national de l’Etat, des 
collectivités territoriales, des établissements publics et des personnes privées, relevant de 
catégories d’opérations dont la liste est fixée par décret en Conseil d’Etat, dès lors qu’ils 
présentent de forts enjeux socio-économiques ou ont des impacts significatifs sur 
l’environnement ou l’aménagement du territoire. 
« La participation du public peut prendre la forme d’un débat public. Celui-ci porte sur 
l’opportunité, les objectifs et les caractéristiques principales du projet. 
« La participation du public est assurée pendant toute la phase d’élaboration d’un projet, 
depuis l’engagement des études préliminaires jusqu’à la clôture de l’enquête publique réalisée 
en application des dispositions du chapitre III du titre II du livre Ier du présent code ou du 
chapitre Ier du titre Ier du code de l’expropriation pour cause d’utilité publique. 
« En outre, la Commission nationale du débat public veille au respect de bonnes conditions 
d’information du public durant la phase de réalisation des projets dont elle a été saisie jusqu’à 
la réception des équipements et travaux. 
« Elle conseille à leur demande les autorités compétentes et tout maître d’ouvrage sur toute 
question relative à la concertation avec le public tout au long de l’élaboration d’un projet. 
« La Commission nationale du débat public a également pour mission d’émettre tous avis et 
recommandations à caractère général ou méthodologique de nature à favoriser et développer 
la concertation avec le public. 
« La Commission nationale du débat public et les commissions particulières ne se prononcent 
pas sur le fond des projets qui leur sont soumis. 
 
Taken from:  http://www.debatpublic.fr/docs/pdf/loi_2002_02_27.pdf  This has the text of the Loi n° 2002-276 
du 27 février 2002 relative à la démocratie de proximité.  Retrieved on July 8 2013. 
 
Very extensive information can be found on the webpages: 
 http://www.debatpublic.fr/debat-public/principes.html 
